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Smoking and drinking constitute two risk factors contributing to the rising
burden of non-communicable diseases in low- and middle-income countries.
Both issues have gained increased international attention, but tobacco control
has made more sustained progress in terms of international and domestic policy
commitments, resources dedicated to reducing harm, and reduction of tobacco
use in many high-income countries. The research presented here offers insights
into why risk factors with comparable levels of harm experience different
trajectories of global attention. The analysis focuses particular attention on the
role of dedicated global health networks composed of individuals and organ-
izations producing research and engaging in advocacy on a given health
problem. Variation in issue characteristics and the policy environment shape the
opportunities and challenges of global health networks focused on reducing the
burden of disease. What sets the tobacco case apart was the ability of tobacco
control advocates to create and maintain a consensus on policy solutions,
expand their reach in low- and middle-income countries and combine evidence-
based research with advocacy reaching beyond the public health-centered focus
of the core network. In contrast, a similar network in the alcohol case struggled
with expanding its reach and has yet to overcome divisions based on competing
problem definitions and solutions to alcohol harm. The tobacco control network
evolved from a group of dedicated individuals to a global coalition of
membership-based organizations, whereas the alcohol control network remains
at the stage of a collection of dedicated and like-minded individuals.
Keywords Advocacy, health policy, non-communicable diseases, tobacco and alcohol
control.
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KEY MESSAGES
 Tobacco and alcohol are two risk factors contributing to the rising burden of non-communicable diseases (NCDs) in low-
and middle-income countries.
 Global attention to both risk factors has increased during the past decades, but tobacco control has made more significant
gains with regard to policy formation, resource acquisition and reducing harm, especially across a number of
industrialized countries.
 These differences in attention and progress in addressing harm are driven by interactions between issue characteristics,
global health networks and the policy environment. The tobacco control network has been more effective in creating and
maintaining wide-spread consensus about effective policies to harm reduction, expanding its reach in low- and middle-
income countries, and combining evidence-based research with effective advocacy at the highest levels of the World
Health Organization.
Introduction
Tobacco and alcohol use, alongside unhealthy diet and physical
inactivity, represent two risk factors contributing to the rapidly
rising burden of non-communicable diseases (NCDs) in low-
and middle-income countries (World Economic Forum and
Harvard School of Public Health 2011; Institute for Health
Metrics and Evaluation 2013). The rise of NCDs not only
increases demands on health care systems but also negatively
affects economic development and growth. Effective responses
to these mounting health challenges rely on the generation of
knowledge about harm caused, policies that address those
health issues and the ways in which such policies are generated
and diffused globally and domestically.
During the past decades, more rapid progress has been made
in addressing harm caused by smoking, while efforts to address
alcohol harm have lagged behind. At the global level, the 2003
Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) (Yach
2014) establishes legally binding obligations on its signatories,
while it took until 2010 for the adoption of a non-binding
Global Strategy to reduce harmful use of alcohol. In most
industrialized countries, smoking prevalence has decreased
sharply since the 1960s, but alcohol consumption remains
steady or increased across most regions of the world (World
Health Organization 2011: 8). Most importantly, decades ago
both smoking and drinking were socially accepted in developed
countries, industry interests were powerful, and few to no
resources were dedicated to addressing the significant harm
caused by both risk factors. Today, the tobacco industry stands
out as a pariah in the commercial sector, while the alcohol
industry is still viewed by many as a legitimate stakeholder in
shaping domestic and international policies designed to reduce
harm caused by its products.
Dedicated global health networks play a central role in raising
awareness about these health issues, but we still have limited
knowledge about their emergence, evolution and strategies.
Comparing two networks dedicated to reducing harm caused by
smoking and drinking through a public health approach offers
important insights into their relative ability to shape global
health policy over time. This public health approach highlights
the importance of surveillance to collect reliable data about the
problem (1), research focused on the causes and contributing
factors (2), community interventions addressing the root causes
of the condition (3) and regular monitoring and evaluation to
ensure efficiency and effectiveness (4).
The comparison presented here explores in what ways
differences in issue characteristics and the policy environment
interact with network structures and strategies to produce
specific outcomes expressed in the adoption of policy solutions
and the amount of financial resources dedicated to the health
problem. It provides an initial set of propositions about how
global health networks can enhance their effectiveness by
focusing attention on the political process of expanding their
reach through coalition-building and gaining crucial support
outside of the core group sharing a public health understanding
of a problem and its root causes.
Conceptual framework
This study is part of the Global Health Advocacy and Policy
Project (GHAPP), a research initiative examining networks that
have mobilized to address six global health problems: tubercu-
losis, pneumonia, tobacco use, alcohol use, neonatal mortality
and maternal mortality. Its aim is to understand how networks
crystallize around health issues and why some are better able to
influence policy and public health outcomes. GHAPP studies
draw on a common conceptual framework grounded in theories
on collective action from political science, sociology and eco-
nomics (Snow et al. 1986; Stone 1989; Powell 1990; Kingdon
1995; Kahler 2009). The introductory paper to this supplement
presents the framework in detail (Shiffman et al. 2016).
The GHAPP studies specifically examine network outputs,
policy consequences and impact. Outputs are the immediate
products of network activity, such as guidance on intervention
strategy, research and international meetings. Policy conse-
quences may include the adoption of international resolutions
or treaties, increased funding, national policy adoption and the
scale-up of interventions. Impact refers to the ultimate objective
of improvement in population health.
The framework consists of three categories of factors
(Shiffman et al. 2016: Figure 1). One category, network and
actor features, concerns factors internal to the network
involving attributes of the actors that created and constitute
the network and its strategies. This category covers character-
istics of individuals and organizations that shape network
capacity to act and influence their environment. A second
category, the policy environment, concern factors external to
the network that shape both its nature and the effects the
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network hopes to produce. The third category, issue character-
istics, concerns features of the problem the network seeks to
address. GHAPP studies begin with the presumption that no
single category of factors takes precedence. Instead, analysis
focuses on how factors within each category interact with one
another to produce policy and public health effects.
Several factors in each category may be particularly influen-
tial. Among network and actor features, the existence of
effective leaders may be one reason networks crystallize in
the first place, and why, once they appear, they are able to
achieve their objectives. The quality of governance may also
matter, in particular the institutional forms adopted by network
members to pursue collective goals (Buse and Walt 2000). A
third factor is composition. Diverse networks that link scien-
tists, advocates, policymakers and others from both high- and
low-income countries may achieve better outcomes because
diversity improves collective understanding and problem solving
capacities (Page 2007). But heterogeneity can sometimes also
be problematic, as it may cause internal divisions. The fourth
factor is framing strategies (Snow et al. 1986) or the activities
network actors display in publicly position an issue.
Several factors in the policy environment may be particularly
influential. Among these are potential allies and opponents. If
there are many groups whose interests align with a network’s
goals, that network is more likely to expand and be effective
than one that faces a dearth of potential allies. Opponents, such
as the alcohol and tobacco industries, may both hinder and
facilitate network outcomes: they seek to discredit the network
or co-opt members, but may also inspire mobilization.
Substantial funding may enable a network to flourish; however,
a network set up at the behest of donors may be perceived as
less legitimate than those that emerge from grassroots activism.
Norms—standards of appropriate behaviour for a particular
group of actors—may also be influential. Important examples of
influential norms in global health are those that the health-
related Millennium Development Goals advance (Fukuda-Parr
and Hulme 2011). These goals have raised expectations that
states, intergovernmental organizations and other global actors
act to reduce burden from that subset of global health problems
selected for inclusion.
Among issue characteristics, severity, tractability and the
nature of affected groups may be particularly relevant. Robust
networks may be more likely to emerge around issues with
high mortality and morbidity rates or social disruption. Also,
individuals and organizations may be more likely to act on
problems perceived to be solvable (Stone 1989). In addition,
affected populations that inspire sympathy, such as children,
may be more likely to lead to network mobilization (Schneider
and Ingram 1993) than those that do not. Also, positive
network results may be more likely if affected populations are
able to mobilize on their own behalf, as some people living with
HIV/AIDS have done.
Methodology
This study combined a process-tracing methodology involving
in-depth examination of social and political processes with a
paired comparison. Process-tracing is used to uncover causal
mechanisms linking specific explanatory factors to policy
outcomes (Yin 2008; Bennett 2010). The paired comparison
allows for retaining the in-depth qualitative analysis, while also
making some inferences about the relative importance of
factors highlighted in single-case studies across other cases
(Brady and Collier 2004; Tarrow 2010). GHAPP researchers
used the same methodology, began with the same basic set of
questions, and were in regular communication in order to share
insights as the studies unfolded. The alcohol–tobacco compari-
son presented here relies on an analysis of events over time that
identifies the key events relevant for understanding the
evolution and effectiveness of the two global health networks.
This descriptive inference (Collier 2011) is used to ascertain the
relative importance of factors identified in the conceptual
framework. For example, we used the interviews to inquire
about the relevance of prior policy efforts such as prohibition or
how exactly network members participated in international
policy negotiations around their health issue.
The comparison of the alcohol and tobacco case commenced
with a careful study of documents and archival materials,
followed by semi-structured interviews with experts focused on
the emergence and evolution of each network. Documents and
archival materials consisted of several hundred scholarly
articles produced by network members, policy submissions to
national and international bodies, editorials, press releases and
World Health Organization (WHO) background documents.
Semi-structured interviews were conducted with a total of 55
individuals familiar with the actions of the global health
networks. Interviewees were offered anonymity to enhance the
overall reliability of the data collected regarding network
features and strategies. Supplementary Appendix I contains a
list of interviewees who gave consent to recording and
transcribing their answers. Some of these individuals were
interviewed more than once and have provided feedback
throughout the development of the case studies.
Supplementary Appendix II provides an outline of the themes
covered in the interviews.
Additional interviews and background conversations were
conducted after the completion of initial draft versions of the
individual case studies. We conducted a member checking
process by inviting seven key informants to provide detailed
written feedback on the case studies. Other interviewees and
experts provided feedback at network conferences where initial
results were presented. We received extensive feedback on our
results at meetings of these global health networks and other
experts, including the 2012 American Public Health Association
meetings in San Francisco, the 2013 Global Alcohol Policy
Conference in Seoul, South Korea and the 2013 Alcohol Policy
16 conference in Arlington, Virginia.
The results reported offer initial evidence about how issue
characteristics, network features and the policy environment
shape the effectiveness of global health networks. Three core
limitations emerged during the research process and suggest
the need for additional research on this topic. First, data and
information about the early stages of network emergence and
evolution are less reliable because of very scant written
documentation about the inner workings of the networks as
well as interviewees’ limited capacity of recollection. Second,
we initially identified interviewees through a literature review
and later using snowball sampling. This may have generated a
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selection bias and limited the diversity of viewpoints collected.
Third, the comparison concerns two networks at different
stages of their development. What this study cannot answer is
if the alcohol control network will experience the same level of
success witnessed in the tobacco case over time, or if its
challenges identified here will limit its effectiveness in the long-
term.
Results
We organize the results section along the three categories of
issue characteristics, network and actor features and policy
environment. This presentation serves two main purposes. First,
we highlight the factors that the paired comparison identifies as
most relevant to explaining why the tobacco control network
was more effective than its alcohol counterpart. While the
global health network on tobacco control has already been
studied in some detail (Roemer et al. 2005; Mamudu et al.
2011), the first systematic review of the global health network
on alcohol is included in this issue (Schmitz 2016). Second, we
address how factors explaining relative network effectiveness
are causally linked to each other.
We define network effectiveness as the ability to set agendas
of international institutions, to prompt international and
domestic policy adoption in line with network objectives, to
raise funds from public and private donors and to ultimately
reduce harm and improve population health. In relative terms,
the tobacco control network has been more effective with
regard to global policy adoption, resource mobilization and
harm reduction. At the global level, both networks were able to
increase awareness about their issue and succeeded in getting
the WHO and its member states to adopt policies designed to
reduce harm. But in the alcohol case, this commitment remains
non-binding, whereas the FCTC imposes more well-defined
legal obligations on its signatories. In addition, major philan-
thropic donors, including the Bloomberg Philanthropies and Bill
and Melinda Gates Foundation, pledged in the mid-2000s more
than $600 million to tobacco control (Bloomberg Philanthropies
2011). Both initiatives share a focus on the promotion of
tobacco control policies and laws in low- and middle-income
countries, but have developed different emphases in their grant
programs. In sharp contrast, in the four years after the adoption
of the Global Strategy no significant financial commitments
from public or private sources have been forthcoming in
support of global alcohol control. Although the WHO currently
projects an increase in smoking deaths from 6 to 8 million by
2030, tobacco use has significantly dropped in most industria-
lized countries where the most stringent public health measures
have been in place for some time. In the alcohol case, we
observe considerably less progress, including no significant
funding dedicated to harm reduction and virtually unchanged
global consumption levels in the past decades (World Health
Organization 2011: 8).
How do we explain the increase in global attention to both
risk factors, but their diverging subsequent trajectory? We argue
that the respective global health networks advancing public
health solutions play a critical role in conjunction with issue
characteristics and the policy environment. Issue characteristics
and historical experiences with reducing harm caused by
smoking and drinking have shaped the conditions under
which both networks emerged and evolved. Most importantly,
the prevalence of a range of problem definitions in the post-
Prohibition era explains why the global health network on
alcohol faced much greater challenges to coalition-building and
effectiveness from the very start. Perceptions of failed prohib-
ition led to the establishment of competing problem definitions
and solutions, including alcoholism as a treatable medical
condition, the recovery approach represented by Alcoholics
Anonymous (AA), the activism of social movements against
drunk driving and the public health approach focused on
population-level policies and the role of industry as a ‘vector of
disease’ (Gilmore et al. 2011). At its inception, the tobacco
control network had to insure that it created and maintained a
consensus about how to address harm beyond simply identify-
ing the industry as the main enemy. This positive consensus
required agreement not only about specific interventions, but
also on strategic choices about how to implement those policies,
including the push for the FCTC.
As the networks developed and matured, their intrinsic
features (leadership, governance, composition and framing
strategies) become increasingly important in explaining differ-
ences in their respective ability to expand membership and
recruit allies. Both networks are effective in using evidence-
based research in advancing agenda-setting and their own
policy solutions, but the tobacco network grew more quickly, its
leadership had higher-level access in the WHO hierarchy, and
its expanding presence in low- and middle-income countries
provided it with greater legitimacy when compared with the
alcohol network. The policy environment as the third and final
category of factors began to matter when both networks are
established and actively agitate for their causes. In the incipient
stages of both networks, the policy environment in the
industrialized world was dominated by powerful tobacco and
alcohol industries, and social acceptance of smoking and
drinking was high. As the networks began to mobilize and
evolve, responses in the policy environment differed. Most
importantly, the tobacco industry’s persistent denial of harm
provided anti-smoking advocates with a strategic advantage
once evidence about the link between smoking and cancer
became irrefutable. In contrast, the alcohol industry effectively
combined a denial of harm to the vast majority of the
population with an acknowledgement that ‘heavy drinking’ is
a problem that the industry is effective in addressing through
self-regulation. As a result, the well-funded efforts of the
alcohol industry to establish their definition of harm and
solutions reinforce the existing divisions among activists with
divergent sets of problem definitions.
Issue characteristics: severity, tractability and
affected groups
Alcohol and tobacco use represent behavioural risk factors with
significant similarities, including their addictive nature, strong
scientific evidence linking use to personal harm, the power of
commercial interests, the disproportionately negative effects on
low-income groups and the social harm caused by second-hand
smoke and drinking. Fourteen % of the world’s population
smoke, whereas 42% drink alcohol (World Health Organization
2011). Although mortality rates for smoking are higher than
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those for drinking, the differences in severity are comparable
when considering rates of morbidity and overall social harm
caused by alcohol consumption. Smoking is currently responsible
for 8% (5.4 million) of all deaths and 3.9% of the global burden
of disease and injury (measured in disability-adjusted life years).
In comparison, alcohol use caused 5.9% (3.3 million) of all
deaths and 5.1% of the global burden of disease and injury in
2012 (World Health Organization 2014). Alcohol’s much greater
prevalence causes significant social harm, including loss in
economic productivity and injury to others. Low- and middle-
income countries and their economic development are particu-
larly threatened since alcohol is the leading risk factor for death
and disability for the economically productive 15–59 age group
(World Health Organization 2014: 57).
Considering the high burden of harm caused by both tobacco
and alcohol, severity alone cannot explain the observed
variation in global responses to both risk factors. Instead, the
following comparative summary of issue characteristics focuses
first on differences in severity, then on how variation in
tractability is shaped by historical experiences in reducing
harm, and finally on the significance of affected groups.
While the health risks attributed to alcohol and tobacco use are
well researched, there are important differences with regard to
our current understanding of harm. Only after decades of
research and activism, there is a consensus today that tobacco
use kills half of all smokers using the product as intended. This
evidence offers a solid base for mobilizing around the issue,
policy solutions (e.g. raising taxes and banning marketing) and
shifting responsibility away from individuals to the activities of
industry. In contrast, alcohol use is currently linked to 200
diseases (Room 2013), but many adverse effects remain under-
researched, including links to domestic violence or how alcohol
use undermines recovery from other health problems. In
addition, some health benefits of moderate alcohol consumption
at age 45 or older also present greater framing challenges for
public health advocates. In the tobacco case, the gap between
objective harm established by scientific research and the public
perception of harm has narrowed to a much larger degree than
in the alcohol case.
Differences in the perceived complexity of adverse health
effects have become the basis for diverging approaches to
addressing alcohol harm. The diversity of alcohol-related harm,
including immediate (e.g. drunk driving, domestic violence) as
well as more long-term effects creates demand for a broad
variety of solutions. While the global health network addressing
tobacco harm succeeded over time to develop and maintain a
general consensus about how to reduce smoking rates, it has
proven to be more challenging to create such a consensus in the
alcohol case. In the tobacco case, coalition-building played a
crucial role in expanding the network and in acquiring policy
expertise to engage in the broader politics debates of the issue
at domestic and international levels. More intensive collabor-
ation reinforced unity and allowed individual groups to benefit
from the capacities of allies (Weishaar et al. 2015). In the
alcohol case, such a broader network bringing together all
parties interested in reducing harm (except for the industry)
remains to be established.
A second characteristic that sets alcohol apart from tobacco is
the Prohibition era and its legacy (Schrad 2010), which have
shaped contemporary debates about problem definitions and
policy solutions (Interviews A1, A3, A4, A9). The widely
perceived failure of Prohibition established in the early 20th
century in the USA and some European countries (Okrent
2010) has profoundly shaped subsequent policy responses to
rising harm caused by alcohol at domestic and international
levels. While the temperance movement became one of the
most powerful social movements of the late 19th and early 20th
centuries (Schrad 2010), efforts to control smoking were much
less relevant at the time primarily because tobacco consumption
was low and links between smoking and cancer had yet to be
established. The end of Prohibition in the 1930s was less
relevant for tobacco control efforts later on, but splintered the
surviving alcohol control movement during the 1930s and again
after World War II into several separate movements with
distinct and often incompatible approaches to addressing
alcohol harm (Interviews A1, A5, A9). Today, three distinct
approaches to alcohol harm—public health, individual (moral)
responsibility and medical treatment—are advanced by separate
groups disagreeing about what constitutes the problem and
how to address it. AA, founded in 1935, advances an individu-
alistic approach that explicitly rejects public policy engagement.
Similarly, the medical treatment and recovery community also
focuses exclusively on the small subset of people identified as
addicted drinkers and emphasizes individual approaches to
recovery (Beauchamp 1980; Roizen 1991). Advocates against
drunk driving do seek changes of public policy, but focus
exclusively on one particular harm and rarely endorse popula-
tion-based measures (Lerner 2011). It is the perceived failure of
prohibition that played an important role in giving rise to
competing approaches to alcohol harm (Interviews A1, A5).
Divergence in how different groups define the problem and
issue characteristics are not merely a reflection of the objective
harm caused, but a result of competing normative claims about
the place of alcohol in society (Gusfield 1981).
In contrast, tobacco as a regulatory issue only gained
momentum when scientific evidence about harm became
widely shared knowledge among scientists and the medical
community. While agreement about harm is important, net-
works are particularly relevant in forging consensus on appro-
priate solutions. Here, the anti-smoking movement early on
focused on establishing a common public health approach
focused on prevention, protection and smoking cessation. While
tobacco control represents a policy field that encompasses a
diverse set of interventions (e.g. non-smoker protection,
demand reduction, product regulation), these dimensions are
all part of a public health approach, which advances govern-
ment-led tobacco control intervention as effective solutions.
Tobacco control debates between reducing harm and preventing
all forms of tobacco use do represent two competing end goals,
but these disagreements did not undermine the broader
consensus maintained as the network expanded its activities
and began to focus on the WHO and the FCTC.
A final issue characteristic setting tobacco apart from alcohol is
the constitution and perceptions of affected groups. Because
there are no safe levels of tobacco use, the policy focus is simply
on all users and highlights cessation as the single strategy of
choice. Protecting non-smokers from harmful effects of tobacco
entails also population-based approaches that effectively reduce
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not only exposure, but also overall consumption. In contrast,
different forms of alcohol use have given rise to a diverse set of
policy proposals focused on only addressing drunk driving,
protecting the unborn from fetal alcohol syndrome, or reducing
incidents of cancer. Unlike the tobacco case, each of the affected
groups has given rise to separate and often competing activism to
reduce a particular harm. Even more importantly, the availability
of functioning health care systems in many industrialized
countries with the highest levels of alcohol consumption
diminishes perceptions of severity through the medical treatment
of harm. Finally, almost half of the global population consumes
alcohol and many of those claim to enjoy it and are relatively
well-off. When compared with tobacco use, the group at risk is
not only larger, but also more diverse, undercutting perceptions
of urgency to address the substantial harm caused by this drug.
As tobacco use in developed countries dropped more quickly
among high-income than lower income populations (Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention 2009), raising taxes and other
interventions faced less resistance at the elite levels. In contrast,
alcohol control has yet to reach a tipping point where reduced
prevalence combined with policy interventions would create a
reinforcing virtuous cycle.
Network and actor features: composition, framing
strategies and leadership
Issue characteristics and historical precursors set up very
different starting conditions for the two global health networks
emerging in the 1970s and 1980s. While the strengthening of
tobacco control advocacy tracks closely the growing scientific
evidence on harm caused by smoking, the global health
network on alcohol control emerged amidst disagreements
about how to best address drinking as a global health issue. The
emerging networks differed with regards to their composition,
framing and leadership, equipping them with different abilities
to influence their respective policy environments. In particular,
the tobacco control network was more effective in expanding its
reach into low- and middle-income countries and its leadership
was able to get access to the top-level leadership at the WHO to
advance its goal of an international treaty. The anti-smoking
network’s ability to expand its support base globally combined
with its leadership explains why it was able to successfully
push for a legally binding treaty as a key step towards
attracting more funding and setting in motion a process of
implementing meaningful tobacco control measures in WHO
member states. In contrast, the alcohol control network
remains much smaller, less diverse and features more limited
leadership skills needed to move from an agenda-setting role to
an ability to shape policy formation and implementation.
Following the official acceptance of scientific evidence linking
smoking and cancer both in the United States and Europe,
network activity around global tobacco control started to
emerge during the late 1950s and early 1960s although it
would take several decades for an effective network for global
tobacco control to emerge. Until the 1980s, the primary venue
for international collaboration was the Conference on Tobacco
or Health, which allowed scientists and activists to exchange
research and discuss policy responses mainly at domestic levels.
When evidence about the harm of second-hand smoking finally
became overwhelming in the early 1980s, the issue began to
draw wider interest among organizations representing non-
smokers. The 1985 International Summit on Smoking Control,
organized by the American Cancer Society, was the first
meeting explicitly focused on the need to coordinate global
action (Interview T2).
The emerging network around tobacco control resembled an
epistemic community including scientists and advocates marked
by a high level of cohesion around the framing of tobacco control
as public health issue, the industry as vector of disease and
population-based policies as effective solutions (Mamudu et al.
2011). As network members constructed a shared understanding
of tobacco control as public health issue based on scientific
evidence, advocacy leadership around global tobacco control also
started to crystallize. In 1993, a small group of activists proposed
for the first time the idea of an international treaty. This group,
led by Roemer, Taylor and Mackay combined legal and medical
expertise to exercise norm entrepreneurship in setting the course
for how to proceed collectively at the international level. In their
view, an international treaty represented a crucial step in
legitimizing and strengthening tobacco control initiatives across
countries.
The year 1999 represented the transition from the incipient
stage of the network to its rapid growth as the WHO started to
negotiate an international treaty on tobacco control—the FCTC.
The same year, the Framework Convention Alliance (FCA), which
would represent the central coordinating network of tobacco
control advocates and scientists during the FCTC negotiations,
was formally founded. The creation of the FCA allowed the
network to broaden its reach into low- and middle-income
countries, helped to further strengthen ties between network
members and augmented the capacity and expertise of network
members across the globe (Interviews T5, T15). During the past
decade, the network has further institutionalized its presence and
reached into domestic policy contexts around the world through
the creation of regional network organizations, such as the
Southeast Asian Tobacco Control Alliance (SEATCA) or the
African Tobacco Control Alliance (ATCA). Between 2000 and
2003, membership grew quickly from 25 to 195 members, and it
stands today at 350 non-governmental groups (Interview T14).
In the alcohol case, the emergence of a distinct global health
network did not grow out of a better understanding of harm,
although evidence about the rising mortality and morbidity
rates in low- and middle-income countries would contribute in
the 1990s and 2000s to the slow globalization of the network.
Instead, scientists and activists concerned about rising global
alcohol harm split from existing groups concerned with the
issue based on developing a different understanding of the
problem as well as the appropriate solutions. In 1986, former
members of the International Council on Alcohol and
Addictions (ICAA) launched the Kettil Bruun Society (KBS).
ICAA had long served as a host for a wide range of approaches
to reducing alcohol harm and allowed its members to collab-
orate with industry. In contrast, KBS members emphasized the
role of social conditions in shaping population and health,
including an emphasis on the alcohol industry as a major
contributor to the problem.
In 2000, a conference of public health-focused efforts to
reduce alcohol harm resulted in the creation of the Global
Alcohol Policy Alliance (GAPA). The explicit goal of establishing
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a global body was to counter the growing marketing efforts of
industry targeting low- and middle-income countries (Hesse
2015), and to expand the existing network beyond the
transatlantic context (Interviews A3, A6). Subsequently,
GAPA members established regional bodies in Asia (Indian
Alcohol Policy Alliance, 2004), the Pacific (Asia Pacific Alcohol
Policy Alliance, 2005) and Africa (East African Alcohol Policy
Alliance, 2009/Southern African Alcohol Policy Alliance, 2012),
but the speed and depth of globalizing the network has lagged
behind the tobacco case.
A final factor distinguishing both networks is variation in the
type of leadership exercised during crucial phases of network
creation and evolution. In the tobacco case, evidence about harm
increased pressure for action, but it was the idea of creating an
international agreement introduced by legal experts Roemer and
Taylor that provided a viable strategy integrating the network. In
the alcohol case, in contrast, GAPA and its predecessors emerged
from an explicit desire to abandon previous approaches to
addressing alcohol harm. When Gro Harlem Brundtland became
Director-General of the WHO in 1998, she embraced tobacco
control as a top priority and this additional leadership support
legitimized and broadened the network further and sustained the
issue until the adoption of the FCTC in 2003. In contrast, the
alcohol control network never received this kind of top-level
leadership support at the WHO.
The tobacco network developed relatively quickly into a
diverse and globalized movement that cohered around a single
approach of addressing harm through reducing smoking.
During the late-1990s, the crucial element of leadership
exercised by Brundtland and the rest of the WHO put the
issue on track for the crucial step of a legal agreement, setting
up new global norms and funding opportunities. In contrast,
the alcohol network globalized to a much lesser degree, had
greater difficulties in diversifying support for its distinct public
health approach to reducing harm, and has yet to gain the
leadership support visible in the tobacco case. While the FCA
as a key umbrella group for global tobacco control can point to
hundreds of membership organizations from around the
world, GAPA and its allies still represent primarily a collection
of dedicated individuals, and not yet an alliance of organiza-
tions with a crucial capacity to mobilize. These differences
with regard to network composition, framing and leadership
explain why tobacco control has received more funding, has
given rise to more powerful international norms has and more
effectively excluded commercial interests from the policy-
making process internationally and domestically.
Policy environment: norms, funding and allies/
opponents
Issue characteristics shape network emergence and evolution, but
networks and their members also seek to proactively ascribe new
or different meanings to these characteristics. For example, one
of the key outputs of health networks is the production of
scientific knowledge which shapes public perceptions of severity
and tractability. These activities are primarily targeted at the
policy environment that consists of potential allies and oppon-
ents, offers funding opportunities and is the arena where
activists pursue policy change. Comparing the alcohol and
tobacco cases reveals important differences along all three
factors, including a stronger international legal framework
represented by the FCTC, substantially more funding for tobacco
control and broader alliances and less influential industry
opponents when comparing the tobacco and alcohol cases.
Today’s significant differences regarding the policy environ-
ment show that global health networks matter because these
differences did not exist at earlier stages of network develop-
ment. Decades ago smoking and alcohol use were both socially
accepted in developed countries, industry interests were over-
whelmingly powerful, and there was very limited funding
available for advancing the goals of the respective networks. In
addition, the spread of free trade policies increased the avail-
ability of tobacco and alcohol products. Without recognition of
global health networks as significant actors it is impossible to
understand why these similarities have given way to today’s
quite different policy environments for both cases.
Tobacco control advocates succeeded in their efforts to get a
strong, legally binding global treaty adopted in 2003, while their
counterparts in the alcohol case successfully lobbied WHO
member states to adopt a non-binding agreement to reduce
alcohol harm in 2010. The leadership and personal relationships
of individual tobacco control advocates proved useful in
facilitating their success. The idea of a treaty for tobacco control
first emerged during conversations between Roemer, Taylor and
Mackay and was subsequently introduced at the 1994
Conference on Tobacco or Health (Mackay 2003: 551). Roemer,
Taylor and Mackay combined their respective international law
expertise and personal ties within the WHO. Backed by the
International Non Governmental Coalition Against Tobacco
(INGCAT) and its broad support across many developed and
developing countries, these activists gained the support of Jean
Lariviere, a Canadian World Health Assembly (WHA) delegate
who successfully lobbied other WHA members to request a study
on the feasibility of an international instrument (Roemer et al.
2005). However, a majority of member states raised objections to
a legally binding agreement, and other proposals, including non-
binding instruments, were introduced into the debate. This
changed in 1998 with Brundtland’s appointment to Director-
General, which gave Mackay direct access to her as a member of
the transition team. This direct lobbying contributed to
Brundtland’s decision to include tobacco control into her key
cabinet projects and led to the creation of the Tobacco Free
Initiative, a significant elevation of the issue within the WHO
bureaucracy.
The FCTC negotiations marked the point where the demands
of the global health network became part of the international
health agenda and the interactions between the network and
its policy environment had significant impact on levels of global
attention and policy formulation. By the early 2000s, INGCAT
represented more than 1,000 member organizations from 150
countries and was able to mobilize this representation to
regularly call for a strong global treaty in support of tobacco
control. Founded by the International Union Against Cancer,
the International Union Against Tuberculosis and Lung Disease
and the World Heart Federation, INGCAT was more than a
collection of dedicated researchers and could claim broad
support across a wide range of membership-based groups
focused on different diseases. The adoption of the FCTC in 2003
institutionalized global tobacco control within an inter-
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governmental governance structure and established a set of
policy prescriptions and government obligations for effective
public policymaking around tobacco control. The FCA institu-
tionalized its advocacy efforts by creating formal network
organizations at regional and domestic levels. While FCTC
member states’ resource contributions have remained limited,
private funding sources, such as the Bloomberg and Gates
Foundations, have added more than $600 million to global
tobacco control efforts.
In the alcohol case, the creation of a global normative
framework within the WHO context was only possible after the
completion of the FCTC negotiations. During the 1990s, members
of the global health network focused on alcohol harm had
contributed research on the severity and tractability of the issue
and pushed the WHO to pay greater attention to the topic. By
1999, the WHO published the first Global Status Report on
Alcohol (World Health Organization 1999), followed by additional
reports released in the early 2000s (World Health Organization
2001, 2004a,b). A key focus of these publications was to raise
awareness about low- and middle-income countries as ‘long-
neglected areas where alcohol problems are likely to increase at
an alarming rate in the future’ (Le Galès-Camus 2004).
Nordic countries then took the lead in putting alcohol back
on the WHO agenda, arguing that evidence about rising harm
necessitated a global response (Bull 2005). In 2005, the WHA
adopted its first resolution in favour of a non-binding Global
Strategy to Reduce the Harmful Use of Alcohol. Subsequently,
countries opposed to WHO action on alcohol sought to slow
down the process. For example, a Cuban foreign policy official
expressed doubts in a Swedish newspaper questioning ‘why
push the alcohol question so hard when people lie dying of
AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria’ (cited in: Grimm 2008: 863).
Actual negotiations on the substance of the Global Strategy
commenced in 2009 in Geneva and offered members of the
global health network and other civil society groups to consult
and engage in lobbying activities aimed at strengthening the
public health language of the proposed agreement (Interview
A12). The adoption of the Global Strategy required overcoming
strong resistance by the United States government and other
countries as well as increasing support by low- and middle-
income countries, including Kenya, Rwanda and Thailand
whose representatives increasingly took over leadership on the
issue from Nordic countries (Interview A14).
Despite the success in establishing a global norm to reduce
alcohol harm, this issue continues to lag behind tobacco to a
degree that cannot be fully explained by objective measures of
severity. The adoption of the Global Strategy did not include
any financial commitments on the part of governments aimed
at reducing harm, and private foundations have been largely
absent from this issue. A recent study on public and private
donor commitments concluded that in 2007 less than 3% of
global health spending was dedicated to addressing NCDs
(Nugent and Feigl 2010). While a significant part of this
spending on NCDs is dedicated to tobacco control, only $4
million was identified as being explicitly targeted at alcohol.
Scholars have highlighted a persistent neglect of funding for
alcohol control even after the adoption of the Global Strategy
(Zeigler and Babor 2011), which stands in sharp contrast to
post-2006 decisions by the Bloomberg Philanthropies and the
Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation to dedicate significant
resources to tobacco control. The highly unequal funding
streams put alcohol control advocates at a significant disad-
vantage as they compete for talent and attention with other
NCD risk factors, including obesity and physical inactivity
(Interviews A8, A12). The comparison shows that expanded
funding is particularly crucial for maintaining network mo-
mentum after the adoption of global policies such as the FCTC
or the Global Strategy when global health networks can base
their legitimacy on the public health approach now supported
by WHO member states.
Addressing alcohol and tobacco harm involves facing industry
interests that have been identified by members of the global
health networks as ‘vectors of disease’ (Jahiel and Babor 2007;
Gilmore et al. 2011). Since both tobacco and alcohol industries
are important economic actors, comparing changes in their
involvement in policymaking at international and domestic
levels represents a key indicator of network effectiveness and
future likelihood of domestic adoption of effective policies. The
tobacco industry was not only formally excluded from the FCTC
process and subsequent policy negotiations but is formally
identified as an obstacle for global tobacco control within the
FCTC (Article 5.3). Due to the exclusion from the policymaking
arenas, the tobacco industry has been forced to resort to
confrontational strategies to counteract the global policy
momentum for tobacco control within individual countries
(Interviews T11, T16, T21). Interfering strategies include the
refutation of projected tobacco control policy outcomes, the
activation of front groups to protest tobacco control policies and
the use of global, regional and bilateral trade and investment
agreements as strategic avenues to combat tobacco control
policy diffusion (Fooks 2011; Brandt 2012).
In contrast, the alcohol industry managed to retain its
position within the emerging policy field of global alcohol
control by supporting counter frames against the public health
perspective on alcohol control. Learning from the experience of
the tobacco industry (Bond et al. 2009), the alcohol industry
does not categorically deny harmful effects, but insists on an
exclusive focus on excessive alcohol use and voluntary efforts.
While the industry has limited direct access at the WHO, it
exerts power domestically by disseminating its own policy
templates and cultivating key relationships with domestic
policymakers, thereby effectively shaping member state pref-
erences in policy negotiations regarding alcohol policies
(Interviews A10, A15). At the global level, the alcohol industry
has become increasingly concentrated into larger corporations
that can exert greater influence both at the international and
domestic levels (Jernigan 2009). In recent global negotiations
about addressing NCDs, the industry has managed to be
classified with the food industry as a possible stakeholder
while the same document recognized a ‘fundamental conflict
between the tobacco industry and public health’ (United
Nations General Assembly 2012: para 37 and 38).
Although the alcohol industry has not been entirely excluded
from policymaking processes at the international level, there is
increasing consensus that commercial interests should not be at
the table when discussing policies designed to reduce alcohol
harm (Babor et al. 2013). The Director General of the WHO,
Margaret Chan, has endorsed such a conflict of interest policy
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(Chan 2013). As both the tobacco and alcohol industries remain
powerful industries with extensive lobbying efforts both
globally and domestically, differences in their status at the
policy table matter greatly for public health outcomes.
Discussion
This article provided evidence about the role of global health
networks in contributing to effective policy solutions in
reducing harm caused by alcohol and tobacco use. In both
cases, increased global levels of harm, documented by network
members, led to network crystallization during the 1960s and
1970s. But beyond initial agenda-setting, the two networks
diverge sharply with regard to the degree of consensus built
among activists about how to reduce harm. In the tobacco case,
activists united early on against the tobacco industry and came
to a consensus focused on prevention (targeting youths),
protection (from second-hand smoke) and cessation (targeting
current smokers). In the alcohol case, a very similar public
health focused network formed, but never overcame differences
in problem definition and policy solutions that separated it
from other approaches to alcohol harm, including groups
focused only on drunk driving (Lerner 2011), addiction treat-
ment (Beauchamp 1980; Hester and Miller 2002) and the self-
help approach represented by groups including AA.
Why then is the alcohol case characterized by persistent
disagreements with regard to problem definition and policy
solutions? We argue that specific issue characteristics and the
policy environment play important roles. With regard to issue
characteristics, the legacy of the Prohibition era and perceptions of
more limited harm caused by alcohol create greater challenges for
the global health network to expand and spread consensus. As the
network struggles to move beyond initial agenda-setting, com-
mercial interests contesting alcohol control in the larger policy
environment also actively foster disagreements about problem
definition and solutions. Learning from ‘big tobacco’ and its failed
strategy of denial, the alcohol industry has adopted a proactive
stance focused on narrowing the problem to ‘excessive drinking’
only. This allows the industry to exploit existing divisions among
activists while also projecting an impression of socially responsible
behaviour (Table 1).
The alcohol–tobacco comparison reveals that choices and
strategies of global health networks shape the trajectory of
their causes, in particular their ability to maintain consensus
while expanding their influence beyond the narrow health field.
While the tobacco control network grew along with the
mounting evidence about harm and a consensus about effective
interventions, the alcohol network competed from the very start
with established approaches focused on treatment and individual
responsibility. Both networks were effective in producing scien-
tific evidence to raise awareness, but disagreements about what
constituted harm and effective remedies remained more preva-
lent in the alcohol case. The policies of increased taxation,
restrictions on marketing, and excluding industry from policy-
making are today widely accepted in reducing tobacco harm, but
continue to have much more limited support in the alcohol case.
As the networks developed and matured, their intrinsic
features (leadership, governance, composition and framing
strategies) became increasingly important in explaining differ-
ences in their respective ability to expand membership and
recruit allies. The tobacco control network evolved from a small
group of individuals to a broad civil society coalition supported
by membership-based organizations. This enabled the network
to expand its capacities beyond knowledge generation to
acquire also greater advocacy and policy expertise. In contrast,
the alcohol control network remained a smaller coalition of
dedicated and like-minded individuals with limited capacities
to engage in the political struggles associated with the adoption
of their population-based interventions (e.g. taxation, market-
ing bans) to reduce alcohol harm. As a result, the INGCAT and
the FCA with their broader networks of regional and domestic
organizations were able to make more credible claims regarding
representation and legitimacy (Gneiting 2016).
Finally, the policy environment gains in relevance as both
networks evolve and actively seek to change the world around
them. The industry as the main opponent to both networks is first
to respond and shape further outcomes. The tobacco industry’s
choice to deny harm over decades contrasts with the alcohol
industry’s more proactive stance of accepting some responsibility
and seeking to define the problem as limited to excessive
drinking. In the tobacco case, the industry and its denial fostered
network cohesion, while in the alcohol case the activities of
industry reinforced existing divisions through the creation of its
own civil society groups and funding to researchers. Differences in
network strength then explain why the tobacco control network
successfully pushed for a legally binding global treaty, while the
Table 1 Tracking differences between the tobacco and the alcohol cases
Issue characteristics: severity, tract-
ability and affected groups
Network and actor features: leadership,
composition, governance and framing
strategies
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alcohol network had to settle for a non-binding agreement. In
turn, this difference precipitated a virtuous cycle of attracting
increased funding to tobacco control, an increased focus on
domestic implementation and greater legitimacy for tobacco
control activists able to point to enforceable state commitments.
Both issues are likely to benefit from their inclusion in the third
goal of the Sustainable Development Goals promoting healthy
living and well-being (United Nations 2015).
Conclusions
The results of this comparison offer broader lessons about the
effectiveness of global health networks, especially in the context
of NCDs. An initial implication highlights how perceptions of
issue characteristics, including severity and tractability, are
shaped by historical legacies and prior policy efforts. These
legacies establish an important context for the emergence and
evolution of global health networks. The comparison provides
some initial evidence that the legacy of Prohibition represented
a formidable challenge for alcohol control efforts and needs to
be more explicitly addressed in how the network advances its
policy interventions.
This insight leads to a second implication about the power of
specific strategies and arguments. While global health networks
primarily focus on research documenting harm and evaluating
effective solutions, they are often less well equipped to engage in
the political struggles that emerge when they seek broader
support for their preferred interventions. In the alcohol case,
policies of raising taxes or limiting marketing require engagement
with a broader range of actors beyond the narrow health field.
Arguments that increased taxes lower alcohol harm work well
within the public health community, but they do not necessarily
respond to counter-arguments by industry interests that aim at
portraying alcohol control as prohibitionist and a limit to personal
freedoms. To win the public debate outside of the health arena,
global health networks have to rely on political skills required to
attract allies and maintain cross-sectoral coalitions (Morley 2015).
In the alcohol case, such efforts were successful at the domestic
level in the United States during the 1970s when the Center for
Science in the Public Interest (CSPI) led a coalition of activists
with different problem definitions in jointly lobbying Congress
(Schmitz 2016). At the global level, such a broad coalition
emerged in the tobacco case, but not yet in the alcohol case.
A second promising strategy to overcome these adverse effects
of prior policy efforts is to broaden the legitimacy of the network
by expanding into low- and middle-income countries. First, such
efforts would bring in more network members from regions
where harm is increasing but where no legacy of Prohibition
creates potential rifts among activists. Second, it would allow the
network to claim greater representativeness. Being able to claim
global representation was a crucial ingredient of tobacco control
advocates when gaining access to high-level policy negotiations
in the 1990s. When the WHO leadership changed in 1998, the
tobacco control network was ready to take advantage of this
opportunity and succeeded within 5 years in getting the FCTC
adopted. This policy victory then served as a key stepping-stone
to reaching new goals, including attracting new allies and
financial resources dedicated to the broader issue of tobacco
control.
A third implication highlights the temporary nature of success
as defined here by the extent of global attention and policy
responses. Tobacco control advocates can point to the FCTC as a
key accomplishment, but also face the problem of increased
tobacco use in many middle-income countries as well as threats
to their consensus approach by new technologies, including
electronic cigarettes (Grana et al. 2014). At the same time, the
alcohol case considered here has gained global attention much
later than tobacco control. As a result, the impact of its
activities may not yet be as visible as the well-documented
success of the tobacco control network. Ongoing changes in
issue characteristics and the policy environment require global
health networks to focus continually on maintaining consensus
and reaching out to allies that may or may not share the basic
tenants of the public health approach.
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